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Abstract
Background—Human illness from influenza A(H7N9) was identified March 2013, and 
candidate vaccine viruses were soon developed. To understand factors that may impact influenza 
vaccination programs, we developed a model to evaluate hospitalizations and deaths averted 
considering various scenarios.
Methods—We utilized a model incorporating epidemic curves with clinical attack rates of 20% 
or 30% in a single wave of illness, case hospitalization ratios of 0.5% or 4.2%, and case fatality 
ratios of 0.08% or 0.53%. We considered scenarios that achieved 80% vaccination coverage, 
various starts of vaccination programs (16 or 8 weeks before, the same week of, or 8 or 16 weeks 
after start of pandemic), an administration rate of 10 or 30 million doses/week (the latter rate is an 
untested assumption), and two levels of vaccine effectiveness (two doses of vaccine required; 
either 62% or 80% effective for persons aged <60, and either 43% or 60% effective for persons 
aged ≥60).
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Results—The start date of vaccination campaigns most influenced impact; from 141,000 – 
2,200,000 hospitalizations and 11,000 – 281,000 deaths were averted when campaigns started 
before a pandemic and <100 – 1,300,000 hospitalizations and 0 – 165,000 deaths were averted for 
programs beginning the same time as or after the introduction of the pandemic virus. The rate of 
vaccine administration and vaccine effectiveness did not influence campaign impact as much as 
timing of start of campaign.
Conclusions—Our findings suggest that efforts to improve the timeliness of vaccine production 
will provide the greatest impacts for future pandemic vaccination programs.
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Introduction
Four influenza pandemics have occurred since the beginning of the 20th century and have 
ranged widely in transmissibility and clinical severity [1, 2]. On March 29, 2013, the 
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) confirmed three human 
infections with an avian influenza A(H7N9) virus not previously reported in humans [3]. 
The pandemic potential of this virus was unknown. However, the high case fatality rate 
among humans ill from infection with this H7N9 virus (44 of 135 cases) [4, 5], the increased 
affinity of H7N9 for human-receptor-binding when compared to avian influenza A(H5N1) 
[6, 7], and the lack of pre-existing immunity among humans to H7N9 viruses [7, 8] raised 
concerns about the potential for substantial impact on human health if H7N9 were to 
develop the ability to transmit efficiently among humans. As a precautionary measure, US 
CDC and other partners began development of H7N9 vaccine candidate viruses [9].
The potential impact of a pandemic influenza vaccination program can vary widely based on 
a number of factors, including the size, speed, and number of waves of the pandemic 
outbreak, the number of doses administered, the timing of the vaccination program relative 
to the spread of the novel influenza virus, and the vaccine effectiveness (VE) [10]. To help 
public health officials and policy makers evaluate the impact of a hypothetical vaccination 
program against a future influenza pandemic, we developed a spreadsheet-based model that 
allowed quick exploration of the number of hospitalizations and deaths averted in the United 
States under various vaccination scenarios.
Methods
We adapted a spreadsheet model (Excel, Microsoft Corp., Redmond, Washington, USA) 
that was originally created to estimate the effects of a vaccine program against influenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09 [10]. The model user enters an epidemic curve (the number of persons 
becoming ill by time) and other variables that define the impact of both the pandemic and 
the vaccination campaign. These variables include the timing of the vaccination program 
relative to the introduction of cases into the United States, the number of doses administered 
per week and the allocation by age group, the clinical attack rate, and the ratios of health 
outcomes to the number of cases (e.g., the case hospitalization and case fatality ratios) 
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(Table 1). We adjusted calculations to account for individuals who were naturally 
immunized through infection but who may still be vaccinated.
Calculation Overview
To estimate the number of infections prevented by the vaccination program, we took [the 
number of persons fully vaccinated two weeks prior to the current week in the model] × [the 
probability of not having been previously infected with influenza before being fully 
vaccinated and having developed immunity] × [probability of becoming infected with 
influenza after being fully vaccinated and having developed immunity] × [VE] [10]. We 
utilized standardized epidemic curves, using 20% and 30% clinical attack rates in one wave 
of illnesses and different levels of clinical severity and assumed that the pandemic began 
with 100 persons initially infected (Table 1) [11].
For our model, we assumed that two doses of vaccine administered three weeks apart would 
be needed to be fully effective, based on data indicating that previous H5 and H7 influenza 
vaccines have low immunogenicity [12–14]. We further assumed that, during a pandemic 
with moderate or high mortality, demand for vaccine would be such that 80% of the U.S. 
population would receive two doses of vaccine. We prioritized persons returning for their 
second dose of vaccine over persons who were receiving their first dose. We also assumed 
that vaccine was allocated in a pattern similar to the doses administered among four age 
groups (persons 6 months–9 years of age, persons 10–19 years, persons 20–59 years, and 
persons ≥60 years) during the 2012–13 influenza season [15] (Table 1). Once 80% of an 
age-group was fully vaccinated, we assumed vaccination would end in that age group. 
Remaining vaccine would then be allocated to other age groups until they reached 80% 
coverage. We allowed for a 2-week delay in protection against the virus after administration 
of the second dose of the vaccine [16].
We ran multiple scenarios to explore the effects of the quantity of the doses administered, 
the timing of the vaccine program, and the VE of the first and second doses. We first 
assumed that the program would administer either 10 million doses per week 
(approximating the maximum number of doses administered per week during seasonal 
influenza programs [17]) or 30 million doses per week; the latter has yet to be achieved 
during seasonal influenza vaccination programs. To explore the effects of timing of the 
vaccine program, we modeled programs starting at 5 different time points, separated by 8-
week intervals: 16 weeks before, 8 weeks before, the same week as, 8 weeks after, and 16 
weeks after the first cases of the novel influenza virus were introduced into the United 
States. We also assumed that one dose of vaccine was 0% effective for all age groups and 
two doses of vaccine were 62% effective in protecting against subclinical and clinical cases, 
hospitalizations, and deaths for persons aged <60 years old and 43% for persons aged ≥60 
years (Table 1). These values were based on the VE of the monovalent, inactivated, un-
adjuvanted influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine [10]. For the second scenario, we assumed a 
high VE due to the use of higher concentrations of hemagglutinin antigen [18] or the 
addition of an adjuvant to the vaccine [19]. In the high VE scenario, we assumed some VE 
with one dose (40% VE for persons <60 years old and 30% for persons ≥60s) and higher VE 
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with two doses (80% effective for persons <60 years old and 60% for persons ≥60 years old) 
(Table 1).
To calculate the number of vaccine-associated averted outcomes (hospitalizations and 
deaths), we assumed 50% of infected cases were symptomatic and either 1.05% of 
symptomatic cases were hospitalized and 0.084% of symptomatic cases would die (low 
severity scenario) or 4.2% of symptomatic cases were hospitalized and 0.53% of 
symptomatic cases would die (high severity scenario) (Table 1). We adjusted the risk of 
hospitalization and death by age group (Table 1). The values for hospitalizations and deaths 
were based on estimates predicted for a pandemic with high clinical severity, and the 
adjustments for age were based on historic pandemics [11, 20].
Results
Base case Scenario
For the scenario with a cumulative clinical attack rate of 20%, without any other intensive 
interventions, the simulated pandemic peaked in the United States 20 weeks after the 
introduction of the first 100 cases and resulted in 127,000,000 infections, 63,500,000 clinical 
cases, and 669,000 hospitalizations and 54,000 deaths in the low severity scenario or 
2,700,000 hospitalizations and 336,000 deaths in the high severity scenario (Figures 1, 2, 
and 3). For the scenario with a cumulative clinical attack rate of 30%, the simulated 
epidemic peaked 12 weeks after the start and resulted in 188,000,000 infections, 94,000,000 
clinical cases, and 1,070,000 hospitalizations and 86,000 deaths in the low severity scenario 
or 4,300,000 hospitalizations and 538,000 deaths in the high severity scenario (Figure 1). 
Vaccination programs distributing 10 million doses per week would take 54 weeks to 
achieve 80% coverage of a two-dose vaccine series among all age groups, while programs 
distributing 30 million doses per week would take 21 weeks (Figure 1).
Effects of a program beginning before (8 or 16 weeks) the introduction of 
influenza infections—For an influenza pandemic with a 20% overall cumulative attack 
rate and high clinical severity, we estimated that a vaccination program beginning 8 weeks 
before the pandemic started in the United States and that administered 10 million doses of 
vaccine with the moderate VE per week could avert 568,000 hospitalizations and 71,000 
deaths (21% reduction relative to no vaccine). Starting the vaccination program 16 weeks 
before the pandemic started would avert 777,000 hospitalizations and 97,000 deaths (29% 
reduction) (Tables 2 and 3; Figures 2 and 3). A vaccine program administering 30 million 
doses per week that started 8 or 16 weeks before the pandemic would avert 1,000,000 
hospitalizations and 130,000 deaths (39% reduction) (Tables 2 and 3; Figures 2 and 3). 
Assuming that the VE would be 80% and 60% for persons <60 years and ≥60 years 
respectively (compared to base assumption of 62% and 43% for persons <60 years and ≥60 
years respectively) would further reduce hospitalizations and deaths by at least an additional 
10% relative to no vaccine for both the 10 and 30 million administration scenarios (Tables 2 
and 3).
For an influenza pandemic with a 30% overall cumulative attack rate and high clinical 
severity, we estimated that a vaccination program beginning 8 weeks before the pandemic 
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started in the United States that administered 10 million doses of vaccine with the moderate 
VE per week could avert 570,000 hospitalizations and 71,000 deaths (13% reduction relative 
to no vaccine). Starting the vaccination program 16 weeks before the pandemic started 
would avert 924,000 hospitalizations and 116,000 deaths (21% reduction) (Tables 2 and 3; 
Figures 2 and 3). A vaccine program administering 30 million doses per week that started 8 
weeks before the pandemic would avert over 1,400,000 hospitalizations and 180,000 deaths 
(33% reduction) while one that started 16 weeks before the pandemic would avert 1,700,000 
hospitalizations and 207,000 deaths (38% reduction) (Tables 2 and 3; Figures 2 and 3). 
Using the high VE would further reduce hospitalizations and deaths relative to no vaccine 
for both the 10 and 30 million administration scenarios by at least an additional 7% (Tables 
2 and 3).
Effects of a program beginning the same week as the introduction of 
influenza infections—For an influenza pandemic with a 20% overall cumulative attack 
rate and high clinical severity, we estimated that a vaccination program beginning the same 
week as the pandemic started in the United States that administered 10 million doses of 
vaccine with the moderate VE per week could avert 375,000 hospitalizations and 47,000 
deaths (14% reduction). A vaccine program administering 30 million doses per week that 
started the same week as the pandemic would avert 916,000 hospitalizations and 114,000 
deaths (34% reduction) (Tables 2 and 3; Figures 2 and 3). Using the high VE would further 
reduce hospitalizations and deaths by at least an additional 7% relative to no vaccine for 
both the 10 and 30 million administration scenarios (Tables 2 and 3).
For an influenza pandemic with a 30% overall cumulative attack rate and high severity 
scenario, we estimated that a vaccination program beginning the same week as the pandemic 
started in the United States that administered 10 million doses of vaccine with the moderate 
VE per week could avert 260,000 hospitalizations and 32,000 deaths (6% reduction) (Tables 
2 and 3; Figures 2 and 3). A vaccine program administering 30 million doses per week 
would avert 777,000 hospitalizations and 97,000 deaths (18% reduction) (Tables 2 and 3; 
Figures 2 and 3). Using the high VE would reduce hospitalizations and deaths by at least an 
additional 4% relative to no vaccine for both the 10 and 30 million administration scenarios 
(Tables 2 and 3).
Effects of a program beginning after (8 or 16 weeks) the introduction of 
influenza infections—For an influenza pandemic with a 20% overall cumulative attack 
rate and high clinical severity, we estimated that a vaccination program beginning 8 weeks 
after the pandemic started in the United States that administered 10 million doses of vaccine 
with the moderate VE per week could avert 183,000 hospitalizations and 23,000 deaths 
(6.8% reduction relative to no vaccine). Beginning the vaccination program 16 weeks after 
the pandemic started would avert 17,000 hospitalizations and 2,000 deaths (0.6% reduction) 
(Tables 2 and 3; Figures 2 and 3). A vaccine program administering 30 million doses per 
week that started 8 weeks after the pandemic would avert over 538,000 hospitalizations and 
67,000 deaths (20% reduction) while one that started 16 weeks after the pandemic would 
avert 50,000 hospitalizations and 6,000 deaths (1.9% reduction) (Tables 2 and 3; Figures 2 
and 3). Using the high VE would reduce hospitalizations and deaths by at least an additional 
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1% relative to no vaccine for both the 10 and 30 million administration scenarios (Tables 2 
and 3).
For an influenza pandemic with a 30% overall cumulative attack rate and high clinical 
severity, we estimated that no vaccination program that began 8 or 16 weeks after the 
pandemic started in the United States would avert more than 36,000 hospitalizations and 
4,600 deaths (<1% reduction), regardless of whether 10 million or 30 million doses of 
vaccine per week with the moderate VE were administered (Tables 2 and 3; Figures 2 and 
3). Using the high VE would reduce hospitalizations and deaths by no more than 5% relative 
to no vaccine for the vaccination programs beginning 8 weeks after the pandemic started in 
the United States. For the high VE scenarios starting 16 weeks after the pandemic started in 
the United States, no additional reductions in hospitalizations or deaths were observed 
(Tables 2 and 3).
Discussion
In our analysis, the clinical attack rate and case-hospitalization-and-fatality ratios had the 
greatest impact on the number of severe outcomes averted in the United States while the 
vaccination program factor with the greatest impact was the timing of the start of 
vaccination relative to the start of a pandemic. For example, under the 30% clinical attack 
rate and 30 million doses per week scenario, a vaccination program starting 16 weeks before 
the start of the pandemic in the United States results in a 38% reduction in hospitalizations 
and deaths. Delaying the start of vaccination to the same week as the pandemic starts in the 
United States drops the reductions to 18%. The number of vaccine doses administered each 
week is also very important. Decreasing the doses administered to 10 million per week 
causes the impact of vaccination in the above two scenarios to decline to 21% and 6% 
reductions, respectively. The assumptions related to VE of the first and second doses were 
relatively less important.
This study highlights several key components to pandemic influenza preparedness, 
especially for a severe pandemic, including the importance of ensuring readiness to initiate 
large-scale vaccination programs as early as possible and ideally before the introduction of a 
novel influenza virus into the United States [15, 21]. Factors that may impact vaccine dose 
availability include how soon we develop an appropriate vaccine virus candidate, growth 
characteristics of vaccine virus candidates, influenza vaccine production capacity, efficiency 
of vaccine allocation and distribution, and vaccine administration capacity. Increased 
investment and research in vaccine production technologies, including the use of cell 
derived recombinant proteins [22], virus-like particles [23], or adjuvants (by conserving the 
use of hemagglutinin antigen) have the potential to increase the speed with which the 
number of vaccine doses can be produced.
Also important is the need to identify ways to invest in improvements that will notably 
increase the capacity to administer large number of doses of pandemic influenza vaccine. 
Currently, the peak administration rates for seasonal influenza in the United States are 
between 5–12 million doses per week. CDC is working with state and local health officials 
and vaccine providers to identify means to enhance vaccination administration capabilities. 
Biggerstaff et al. Page 6













In addition to exercising large-scale mass vaccination clinics, this includes increasing 
partnerships with non-traditional vaccine providers, such as pharmacies, supermarket chains, 
and other community vaccine providers, including diverse health, faith, and community 
based-organizations that reach vulnerable, at-risk, hard to reach, and minority populations 
[24, 25].
We evaluated a wide range of vaccine program initiation times relative to disease 
introduction in the United States in this paper. While this information cannot be known in 
advance, beginning vaccination 16 weeks prior to the introduction of disease in the United 
States might be possible if the pandemic virus was identified, a stockpiled influenza vaccine 
were available and appropriate for use, officials were prepared to administer vaccine, and 
the decision to vaccinate was made at least 28 weeks before the establishment of the virus in 
the United States (based on current estimates of 12 weeks to fill and finish and begin 
distribution of stockpiled pandemic vaccine) [26]. This timeline is dependent on robust 
novel influenza virus surveillance that can identify influenza viruses with pandemic 
potential before widespread transmission has occurred. During the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, 
however, the first cases were identified in the United States after widespread transmission 
had already occurred, and no stockpiled vaccine or vaccine candidate seed viruses were 
available. In this example, the first doses of vaccine became available 26 weeks after 
identification of the first case in the United States and 8 weeks after the start of the main 
wave of pandemic illness in the fall of 2009 [27]. This situation is demonstrated by the 
scenarios beginning 8 or 16 weeks after the introduction of the virus into the United States 
[28].
This study has several limitations. Most important, because infections with influenza A 
(H7N9) so far have been rare [5], the modeled number of pandemic-related hospitalizations 
and deaths, and the numbers of such that would be prevented by a vaccination program, can 
only be considered as illustrative and are not based on the current epidemiology of H7N9 or 
other novel influenza virus illnesses. These results, therefore, should not be interpreted as a 
prediction of the impact of a widespread outbreak of H7N9 or any other novel influenza A 
virus with pandemic potential. Additionally, we did not account for the effects of other 
interventions (e.g., non-pharmaceutical interventions such as mass gathering cancellations or 
school closures), the seasonality of when a novel virus might be introduced into the United 
States, or “waves of illness,” which are thought to have occurred in three modern pandemics 
[1, 2]. These factors could slow the course of the pandemic and thereby increase the amount 
of time to initiate and complete a vaccine program, increasing the number of hospitalizations 
and deaths averted. For ease of estimation, we also did not account for any adverse events 
associated with vaccination or for the indirect effects of vaccination (e.g. herd immunity). 
Theoretically, accounting for indirect effects would likely increase the number of 
hospitalizations and deaths averted for those vaccination programs assumed to start before 
the pandemic; this effect would likely be lower for those programs assumed to start the same 
time as or after the pandemic. Another important assumption is that 80% of the population 
would want to be vaccinated. This is distinctly different from recent seasonal influenza 
coverage estimates of approximately 45% [17]. We do not know the precise correlation 
between severity of an influenza pandemic and public demand for vaccination but 80% 
coverage may be an overestimate. Another potential limitation is that no data are available 
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on the VE of a possible H7N9 vaccine. Thus, we based our estimates of VE of either an un-
adjuvanted influenza vaccine, using data from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, or a hypothetical 
vaccine with high VE based on data from adjuvanted 2009 H1N1 vaccine VE estimates. 
Limited data indicate that H7 vaccines have lower immunogenicity than seasonal influenza 
vaccines, which may result in lower VE [29, 30]. The population coverage or the 
effectiveness of a H7N9 or other future pandemic vaccine may be lower than what is 
assumed here, leading to a smaller number of averted outcomes.
Historically, influenza pandemics have been largely unpredictable events, and it is likely 
that the set of assumptions used in this study will vary from the actual events seen in the 
next pandemic, even if influenza A (H7N9) is the virus involved. However, the finding that 
variations in the timing of vaccination administration yield the greatest effect on the 
reduction in hospitalizations and deaths than do variations in rate of vaccine administration 
or effectiveness would likely remain consistent. Continued research and investment in work 
that improves the timeliness of vaccine production and administration will have the greatest 
benefits in the event of another influenza pandemic.
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After comparing the impact of factors that could affect a vaccination program, we found 
that the early administration of a vaccine with a high vaccine effectiveness and a high 
rate of dose administration would prevent the most hospitalizations and deaths.
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The estimated epidemic curve without vaccination and the cumulative number of persons 
protected by an influenza vaccination program with the following assumptions: An overall 
clinical attack rate of the influenza pandemic of 20% or 30%; administered 10 million (left) 
or 30 million (right) vaccine doses; vaccination programs that begin 8 or 16 weeks before, 
the same week, or 8 or 16 weeks after the first cases of a novel influenza virus occur in the 
United States; and the vaccine effectiveness equivalent to the H1N1pmd09-monovalent-
vaccine*.
*2009 H1N1-like vaccine effectiveness: Two doses of vaccine administered three weeks 
apart required to be fully effective (62% for persons <60 years old and 43% for persons ≥60) 
in protecting against subclinical and clinical cases, hospitalizations, and deaths. We assumed 
one dose of vaccine to be 0% effective for all age groups.
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Number of hospitalizations (top) and deaths (bottom) if the overall clinical attack rate of the 
influenza pandemic is 20% and the overall case fatality ratio is 0.53% (high severity 
scenario), 10 million doses (left) or 30 million doses (right) of vaccine are administered each 
week, the vaccination program begins 16 weeks after, 8 weeks after, the same week as, 8 
weeks before, and 16 weeks before the first cases of a novel influenza virus occur in the 
United States, and the efficacy is “H1N1pmd09-monovalent-vaccine”-like*.
*2009 H1N1-like” vaccine effectiveness: Two doses of vaccine administered three weeks 
apart required to be fully effective (62% for persons <60 years old and 43% for persons ≥60) 
in protecting against subclinical and clinical cases, hospitalizations, and deaths. We assumed 
one dose of vaccine to be 0% effective for all age groups.
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Number of hospitalizations (top) and deaths (bottom) if the overall clinical attack rate of the 
influenza pandemic is 20% and the overall case fatality ratio is 0.084% (low severity 
scenario), 10 million doses (left) or 30 million doses (right) of vaccine are administered each 
week, the vaccination program begins 16 weeks after, 8 weeks after, the same week as, 8 
weeks before, and 16 weeks before the first cases of a novel influenza virus occur in the 
United States, and the efficacy is “H1N1pmd09-monovalent-vaccine”-like*.
*2009 H1N1-like” vaccine effectiveness: Two doses of vaccine administered three weeks 
apart required to be fully effective (62% for persons <60 years old and 43% for persons 60) 
in protecting against subclinical and clinical cases, hospitalizations, and deaths. We assumed 
one dose of vaccine to be 0% effective for all age groups.
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Table 1
List of input values used to calculate the number of hospitalizations and deaths prevented due to a national 
vaccination program against an influenza pandemic, United States.
Input Value Reference
Number of initial cases 100 [11]
Cumulative attack rate, % 20 or 30 [11]
Case hospitalization ratio, % Low High
[11, 20]
 All ages 1.05 4.2
 0–19 years 0.15 0.6
 20–59 years 0.45 1.8
 60+ years 6.96 28
Case fatality ratio, % Low High
[11, 20]
 All ages 0.084 0.53
 0–19 years 0.012 0.075
 20–59 years 0.036 0.225




st dose All ages: 0
  2nd dose
<60 years: 62
≥60 years: 43
 High vaccine effectiveness
Assumption  1
st dose by age group
<60 years: 40
≥60 years: 30
  2nd dose by age group
<60 years: 80
≥60 years: 60
Delay in protection against the virus after the administration of the vaccine doses 2 weeks [16]
Cumulative vaccine coverage, all ages, % 80 Assumption







Vaccination administration, in millions per week* 10; 30 [17]; Assumption
Distribution of available doses by age group, %**






We prioritized persons returning for their second doses of vaccine over persons who were receiving their first doses.
**
Once 80% of an age-group was fully vaccinated, we assumed vaccination would end in that age group. Remaining vaccine would then be 
allocated to other age groups until they all reached 80% coverage.
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